"A lawyer shall represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
—§ 1:1, Rule 3(a) (not "should" from CPR Canon 7)
"The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."
—Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)
"The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted ... the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated."
—United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984)
"The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law."
—Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)
"[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"
—Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
“If you’ve got the right lawyer with you, we’ve got the best legal system in the world.”
— Robert Trott, “Justice,” Fox, August 30, 2006, episode 1.1
We, as criminal defense lawyers, are forced to deal with some of the lowest people on earth, people who have no sense of right and wrong, people who will lie in court to get what they want, people who do not care who gets hurt in the process. It is our job–our sworn duty–as criminal defense lawyers, to protect our clients from those people.
—Cynthia Roseberry
From the blog --- http://www.lawofcriminaldefense.com/blog/
More Quotable Quotes about the Law
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
The Philosophy of Tao Te Ching
Chapter 32
The Tao, considered as unchanging, has no name.
Chapter 44
Or fame or life,
The softest thing in the world dashes against and overcomes the hardest; that which has no (substantial) existence enters where there is no crevice. I know hereby what advantage belongs to doing nothing (with a purpose). There are few in the world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising from non-action.
Chapter 56
He who knows (the Tao) does not (care to) speak (about it); he who is (ever ready to) speak about it does not know it. He (who knows it) will keep his mouth shut and close the portals (of his nostrils). He will blunt his sharp points and unravel the complications of things; he will attemper his brightness, and bring himself into agreement with the obscurity (of others). This is called 'the Mysterious Agreement.' (Such an one) cannot be treated familiarly or distantly; he is beyond all consideration of profit or injury; of nobility or meanness:--he is the noblest man under heaven.
Chapter 57
A state may be ruled by (measures of) correction; weapons of war may be used with crafty dexterity; (but) the kingdom is made one's own (only) by freedom from action and purpose. How do I know that it is so? By these facts:--In the kingdom the multiplication of prohibitive enactments increases the poverty of the people; the more implements to add to their profit that the people have, the greater disorder is there in the state and clan; the more acts of crafty dexterity that men possess, the more do strange contrivances appear; the more display there is of legislation, the more thieves and robbers there are. Therefore a sage has said, 'I will do nothing (of purpose), and the people will be transformed of themselves; I will be fond of keeping still, and the people will of themselves become correct. I will take no trouble about it, and the people will of themselves become rich; I will manifest no ambition, and the people will of themselves attain to the primitive simplicity.'
Chapter 58
The government that seems the most unwise,
Chapter 65
The ancients who showed their skill in practising the Tao did so, not to enlighten the people, but rather to make them simple and ignorant. The difficulty in governing the people arises from their having much knowledge. He who (tries to) govern a state by his wisdom is a scourge to it; while he who does not (try to) do so is a blessing. He who knows these two things finds in them also his model andrule. Ability to know this model and rule constitutes what we call the mysterious excellence (of a governor). Deep and far-reaching is such mysterious excellence, showing indeed its possessor as opposite to others, but leading them to a great conformity to him.
Chapter 15
The skilful masters (of the Tao) in old times, with a subtle and exquisite penetration, comprehended its mysteries, and were deep (also) so as to elude men's knowledge. As they were thus beyond men's knowledge, I will make an effort to describe of what sort they appeared to be. Shrinking looked they like those who wade through a stream in winter; irresolute like those who are afraid of all around them; grave like a guest (in awe of his host); evanescent like ice that is melting away; unpretentious like wood that has not been fashioned into anything; vacant like a valley, and dull like muddy water. Who can (make) the muddy water (clear)? Let it be still, and it will gradually become clear. Who can secure the condition of rest? Let movement go on, and the condition of rest will gradually arise. They who preserve this method of the Tao do not wish to be full (of themselves). It is through their not being full of themselves that they can afford to seem worn and not appear new and complete.
Chapter 78
There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, and yet for attacking things that are firm and strong there is nothing that can take precedence of it;--for there is nothing (so effectual) for which it can be changed. Every one in the world knows that the soft overcomes the hard, and the weak the strong, but no one is able to carry it out in practice. Therefore a sage has said, 'He who accepts his state's reproach,
Chapter 76
Man at his birth is supple and weak; at his death, firm and strong. (So it is with) all things. Trees and plants, in their early growth, are soft and brittle; at their death, dry and withered. Thus it is that firmness and strength are the concomitants of death; softness and weakness, the concomitants of life. Hence he who (relies on) the strength of his forces does not conquer; and a tree which is strong will fill the out-stretched arms, (and thereby invites the feller.) Therefore the place of what is firm and strong is below, and that of what is soft and weak is above.
Chapter 71
To know and yet (think) we do not know is the highest(attainment); not to know (and yet think) we do know is a disease. It is simply by being pained at (the thought of) having this disease that we are preserved from it. The sage has not the disease. He knows the pain that would be inseparable from it, and therefore he does not have it.
Chapter 69
A master of the art of war has said, 'I do not dare to be the host (to commence the war); I prefer to be the guest (to act on the defensive). I do not dare to advance an inch; I prefer to retire afoot.' This is called marshalling the ranks where there are no ranks; baring the arms (to fight) where there are no arms to bare; grasping the weapon where there is no weapon to grasp; advancing against the enemy where there is no enemy. There is no calamity greater than lightly engaging in war. To do that is near losing (the gentleness) which is so precious. Thus it is that when opposing weapons are (actually) crossed, he who deplores (the situation) conquers.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Trojan horse entry of home to serve city arrest warrant and search home
In each case, the trial judge must determine whether the officers went to the place to make a lawful arrest, and in making it, looked for evidence lawfully subject to seizure or whether the officers used a pretended arrest for one offense as a "trojan horse" in order to obtain entry, only to prosecute for some greater crime after finding sufficient evidence to justify their belief in greater crime. Handly at page 834. [Handley v. State, 430 P.2d 830 (Okl.Cr. 1967)]
Appellant contends that his arrest on a municipal bench warrant was a subterfuge to gain entrance to his home in order to search for evidence of other offenses, specifically illegal drugs, without having the benefit of a search warrant.
From the majority opinion in Lyons v. Clark, 1989 OK CR 86, 787 P.2d 460:
In support of his proposition Appellant directs this Court's attention to four cases, each from a different court, wherein it was held that the arrest was merely a pretext for an unlawful search. See United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1987), [787 P.2d 462] McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950), Harding v. State, 301 So.2d 513 (Fla.App. 1974), and Handley v. State, 430 P.2d 830 (Okl.Cr. 1967). A review of these cases reveals that in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the relevant test is whether the search was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case. In upholding the Appellant's claim in Causey, the Fifth Circuit relied on Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that the critical question is an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time. The subjective intent alone does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional. 818 F.2d at 358.
A review of the facts of each of the cases cited by Appellant reveals situations wherein the arrest was clearly made to avoid operation of the Fourth Amendment. In Causey, a police officer testified that the sole reason for arresting the defendant on a seven year old warrant for failure to appear for a misdemeanor charge was to gain the opportunity for custodial interrogation of the defendant regarding a bank robbery. In McKnight, officers rejected an opportunity to arrest the defendant on a public street for carrying on a lottery, and instead waited until he entered a house, for which they had no search warrant, in order to seize evidence they hoped to find. In Harding, officers went to the defendant's house to arrest another individual with the clear knowledge that the defendant was involved in the local drug scene.
In Handley v. State, 430 P.2d 830 (Okl.Cr. 1967),the only case from this Court cited by Appellant, county sheriff's deputies, accompanied by two State Narcotic Agents, attempted to serve the defendant with an arrest warrant for the offense of second degree Burglary. As the officers approached the door to serve the warrant, they could see the defendant and his wife run into the bathroom and then return to the front door to admit the officers. Upon entering the house, the officers immediately went to the bathroom to see what had been hidden by the defendant and found drug paraphernalia. The narcotics officers then proceeded to crawl underneath the house and discovered a fruit jar containing morphine. This Court held that the facts did not constitute a reasonable search incident to the arrest for burglary. We stated that the conduct of the officers showed that the arrest warrant was a subterfuge for gaining entrance to the house and searching the premises without obtaining a search warrant. The Court specifically noted the pertinent facts resulting in that conclusion: the presence of State Narcotics Agents to serve a warrant for burglary, that the warrant was not one in which the officers would have been looking for evidence to support the burglary charge (as the defendant had been previously arrested on the same charge and it was assumed that the state had previously found the evidence for the burglary charge), and that the narcotics agents "miraculously discover[ed]" the fruit jar buried underneath the house. Id. at 832-833. This Court concluded that the proper test of a reasonable search and seizure is based upon the entire factual situation. In each case, the trial judge must determine whether the officers went to the place to make a lawful arrest, and in making it, looked for evidence lawfully subject to seizure or whether the officers used a pretended arrest for one offense as a "trojan horse" in order to obtain entry, only to prosecute for some greater crime after finding sufficient evidence to justify their belief in greater crime. Id. at 834.
The above is from Judge Lumkin’s opinion in LYONS v. STATE, 1989 OK CR 86, 787 P.2d 460, which ruled against the defendant and upheld the conviction despite the “Trojan horse” arguments.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Necessity Defense and the Fleeting Moment Defense - Jury Instructions
Defenses to Possession of Firearm After Prior Conviction of Felony or Possession of Controlled Drug: Necessity Defense and the Fleeting Moment Defense
http://www.kscourts.org/ca10/cases/2006/07/03-4158.htm
U.S. v. HAYDAR HAMEED AL-REKABI, No. 03-4158 (10th Cir. July 17, 2007)
A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction when that instruction articulates a correct statement of the law and sufficient evidence has been presented to support the jury’s finding in defendant’s favor on that theory. See United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Swallow, 109 F.3d 656, 658 (10th Cir. 1997).
The Fifth Circuit earlier emphasized the knowledge or intent element of the fleeting possession theory when it discussed it in the context of a drug possession case: “[Defendant’s] possession of the one [marijuana] cigarette was a mere fleeting possession, not inconsistent with honest intention or mere curiosity, and his throwing the cigarette away upon being ordered to stop is not, in our opinion, substantial evidence of a guilty knowledge or intent. Criminal intent is a sine qua non of criminal responsibility.” Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1954); see also United States v. Parker, 566 F.2d 1304, 1306 (5th Cir. 1978) (“That possession is momentary is immaterial” to prosecution for possession of unregistered firearm). Moreover, in an unpublished order and judgment addressing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), this court noted “federal firearms laws impose ‘something approaching absolute liability.’” United States v. Marquez, No. 90-1230, 1991 WL 145264, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 1991) (cited as persuasive authority pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 36.3) (quoting United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1983)).
“If, however, a felon who momentarily possessed a firearm genuinely lacked knowledge that he possessed a firearm or had a legally justifiable reason for possessing it, the fleeting possession theory would apply because the government would have failed in its burden of proving intent. Therefore, the court need only give a fleeting possession instruction when the evidence at trial supports a possible finding that the defendant only momentarily possessed the contraband, and in so doing, lacked either knowledge he possessed contraband or criminal intent to possess it.” See, United States v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1999).
Consider United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982), one of the principle cases relied upon by Adkins. 196 F.3d at 115. There, the Fifth Circuit held the defendant, a former felon, who reached under a bar to grab a handgun to fend off a convicted murderer who was assailing him by stabbing him in the abdomen was justified in doing so. 688 F.3d at 269, 272. Based on our precedent, such conduct, if adequately established, would clearly fall under the necessity defense, as it did in Panter itself. 688 F.3d at 272 n.7 (discussing the differences between a "self-defense" and "necessity" justification and concluding defendant met both). Panter's discussion of the temporary nature of the defendant's otherwise illegal possession of the firearm was tied to the necessity defense. The court pointed out that "our holding protects a . . . defendant only for possession during the time he is endangered. Possession either before the danger or for any significant period after it remains a violation." Id. at 272. We find Panter's discussion of the temporary nature of the necessity defense in accord with our own view.
Posted by
Unknown
1 comments
Independent Evaluation of 3rd Party Consent to Search Containers Separate from Premises
Apparent authority for third party consent requires the court to> independently evaluate the consent's authority over containers onthe> premises separate from the premises. Authority over containers maybe> obviously or apparently limited. United States v. Smairat, 2007 U.S. Dist.> LEXIS 57769 (N.D. Ill. August 8, 2007)
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
The Prejudicial Impact of Plea Bargaining on Minorities
Below is an interesting article about the prejudicial impact that plea bargaining may have upon minorities. See also, Professor Simon's blog at http://www.governingthroughcrime.blogspot.com/
and this article:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KAY/is_3_7/ai_n6203186
What a bargain: the widespread practice of plea bargaining has increased repercussions for people of color who end up literally signing away their lives on the dotted line
Colorlines Magazine: Race, Action, Culture, Fall, 2004
by Rolanda J. West
In the United States, more than 90 percent of all cases in the justice system are settled by plea bargaining rather than exercising the right to trial. The rate of felony convictions of nonviolent crimes in communities of color is over-whelming: African Americans constitute 13 percent of all drug users, yet they represent 35 percent of arrests, 55 percent of convictions and 74 percent of prison sentences, according to a 2000 study by the Sentencing Project.
These two factors mean that the widespread practice of plea bargaining--where prosecutors overcharge for a crime and defense attorneys usually urge defendants to cop a plea for a lighter sentence--has increased repercussions for people of color who end up literally signing away their lives on the dotted line. Defendants are seldom informed about the underlying effects of pleading to a felony--such as losing their right to vote, access to federal student aid, and if they are noncitizens, being deported.
One in four black men have permanently lost the right to vote in seven states. All told, 14 states restrict criminal offenders from voting, and more than 1.4 million black men nationwide cannot vote, according to Human Rights Watch. Some observers argue that if felons had been able to vote in Florida, with its more than 600,000 convicted felons, Bush would have lost the 2000 election.
The racial disproportion in sentencing prompted the Constitutional Rights Foundation to call for a ban on plea-bargaining, in a recent report commemorating the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board. The report cited a U.S. Sentencing Commission study in 1990 finding that 25 percent of whites get their sentences reduced through bargaining, compared to 18 percent of blacks and 12 percent of Latinos.
In 1991 the San Jose Mercury News conducted a massive study of 700,000 California legal cases over a 10-year period. The paper reported that "a third of the white adults who were arrested, but had no prior record, were able to get felony charges against them reduced. Only a quarter of the African-Americans and Latinos with no priors were as successful in plea bargaining."
June Terpstra, a criminal justice scholar at Loyola University Chicago, emphasizes that drug laws play a critical role in imprisoning the majority of black convicts. Although African Americans only make up 12 percent of the population, 44 percent are incarcerated, according to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. In some states, African American men were convicted of drug charges up to 27 times more often than their white counterparts.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
The Inherent Unfairness in DUI Laws
A very interesting article in the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers magazine is the article by by attorneys Eric Sills and Peter Gerstenzang. It concludes that under the application and interpretation of current laws, that DUI offenders are interpreted as having fewer rights that other criminal offenders.
A True Double Standard: A Defense Perspective on the Inherent Unfairness in the Administration of the Impaired Driver Laws By Eric H. Sills; Peter Gerstenzang
Due to the intense pressure placed upon legislators, prosecutors and judges to wage war on impaired drivers — by interest groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving — it is rare that a year goes by without an increase in the penalties imposed for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“DUI”). This pressure, combined with the lack of any organized lobbying on behalf of the drinking or drug-using driver, has led to a true double standard in which the criminal justice system has created two classes of criminals: (1) impaired drivers, and (2) all other criminals.
The inherent unfairness in the administration of the DUI laws pervades virtually every aspect of a DUI case, from the initial stop of the defendant’s vehicle through the administration of the chemical test. In addition, the courts routinely find that the use of so-called “civil penalties” to exact extra punishment on DUI offenders (e.g., driver’s license suspensions pending prosecution, chemical test refusal revocations, vehicle seizures or forfeitures) do not violate either the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause.
This article will demonstrate that the Constitution has been interpreted to provide less protection where the defendant is accused of DUI than it does where the defendant is accused of virtually any other crime, regardless of how serious or despicable.
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/01c1e7698280d20385256d0b00789923/b0e7d25e09976c80852572e40065a3fb?OpenDocument
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
10th Cir - Must consider circumstances of the offense
10th Circuit says must consider circumstances of offense
An unpublished sentencing opinion from the Tenth Circuit in US v. Mahan, No. 05-1518 (10th Cir. May 16, 2007) http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/05/05-1518.pdf
which reverses a within guideline sentence because it was procedurally unreasonable.
Here is the heart of a significant (even though unpublished) ruling:
District courts must consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in applying a sentence that is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to fulfill the aims of those factors. Among other factors, § 3553(a)(1) requires the court to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense" when developing an appropriate sentence. Following Mr. Mahan's description of how and why he came to possess the gun, the district court said "the reasons why you had the weapon ... aren't something the Court can consider," because possession of a firearm by a felon is a strict liability offense. The district court further labeled as "extraneous factors" Mr. Mahan's reasons for possessing the gun and acknowledged such information would have no bearing on its determination of Mr. Mahan's sentence.
The district court was correct that mens rea is not relevant in determining if an individual is guilty of a strict liability crime. However, in determining the appropriate sentence for one guilty of such a crime, the court must consider the factors set forth in § 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances of the offense. We find nothing in § 3553(a) to suggest that the "circumstances of the offense" factor exclusively applies to crimes requiring a mens rea or that this factor is to be specially excluded when arriving at a sentence for a strict liability crime. In fact, we have previously stated that the district court is required to consider all § 3553(a) factors when sentencing an individual for the same strict liability crime presented in this case.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Check out the Governing Through Crime Blog
Jonathan Simon has written some ingenious ideas at his Governing Through Crime blog, he asks this:
Does America accept the moral necessity of a war on crime despite its clear tendency to reinforce almost every aspect of racialized disadvantage and disparity, or is that war on crime a barely disguised strategy to maintain a system of unequal citizenship on the basis of race?
And ends with this:
. . . Thus the hidden danger in all the talk around re-entry about risk assessment and rehabilitation is to deepen the assumption that social pathology must be treated as crime in ways that will structurally disadvantage communities of color.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Taint of Faulty Expert Chemist Testimony Results in Dismissal
On May 11, 2007, Judge Twyla Mason Gray in Oklahoma County District Court dismissed a 22-year-old murder charge against Curtis Edward McCarty ruling the case could not escape the taint of former police chemist Joyce Gilchrist. Gilchrist was a chemist for the Oklahoma City police department who was filed on Sept. 25, 2001, after 21 years as a police department chemist. She had been investigated by the FBI, and investigations were launched into more than 1,400 of the cases assigned to her.
Oklahoma County DA David Prater said his office will not appeal the decision.
Curtis Edward McCarty, 42, who was twice convicted of the 1982 murder of 18-year-old Pamela Kaye Willis and sentenced to die three times, was released on May 11, 2007.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Actual Innocence Data Base - Legal Research on the Web
The Actual Innocence Data Base - Free Online Legal Research
The law library at UT has compiled an Actual Innocence database,containing citations (and links) to current articles, scholarship andother materials regarding wrongful convictions.The materials are classified into what are considered the primarycauses of wrongful conviction:Forensics/DNA;Eyewitness identification;False confessions;Jailhouse informants;Police and/or prosecutorial misconduct; andIneffective representation.
http://web.austin.utexas.edu/law_library/innocence/
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Winning Defense Themes - Prepare the End Game First
Winning Defense Themes - Prepare the End Game First
The general idea for this comes from the NACDL seminar materials.From: "What it Takes to Win Your Case" - "Themes, Theories, andFacts Beyond Change" by Richard Tegtmeier, Colorado Springs, CO, presented Nov. 2002, in Chicago, IL.
It suggests the idea of preparing for a trial by: If you know where you are wanting to go or the final destination, then you can determine what you need to do to get there or what route to take.
Where do you want to go?
If you know what you want to say in the closing argument, then you will know what you have to prove to get there.
1. First look at the jury instructions that you want the jury to be given for your client's theory of the defense. Don't try to force a defense into the trial if it doesn't ring "true." Be consistent. If your client ran a red light which resulted in a death but was not intoxicated, admit your client ran a red light which resulted in death but that he was not intoxicated. Be consistent. (Manslaughter -felony vs. Negligent Homocide - misdemeanor)
2. Argue a powerful defense and not a negative defense. Don't argue --- the state failed to prove it's case---- which implies --- my client is guilty but let him off because the state failed to prove the case ---Instead argue that the client lacks the intent or that they have the wrong man or that he is innocent or innocent of the charged offense. However, what-ever the defense has to ring true to the jury and be consistent with the facts. When you look at the facts use your own intuition and your emotions. Most juries react emotionally to the facts. You must anticipate their emotions. Use your intuition and your emotions. You may want the jurors to "associate" with the emotions of your client. Success with a jury can be related to how well the jury relates to the client's reactions, decisions, and feelings in the case.
3. Next go to closing argument. Ask yourself what you want to be able to tell the jury when you stand to give them the reasons for finding your client not guilty. Give a synopsis of your closing to non-lawyers and ask them their opinion. What they think of your theory and why people would react the way your client reacted. When you run these questions by ordinary people, you will see the natural reactions of people to life circumstances and their gut-level reaction to the case will give you insight that is GENUINE,CLEAR, AND HONEST.
If you know what you want to say in the closing then you will know what you have to prove to get there. There are certain "facts beyond change" or core facts that cannot bechanged in any case. Your theory of defense must be consistent with these "core facts."
Jurors decide cases based upon emotions or their gut-level instincts. Every case has a "dominant" emotion. Determine what that dominant emotion may be or could be. If the theory is self defense --- ask questions during jury selection relating to that dominant emotion --- Tell your investigator what your theory of the defense is and what you expect to argue during closing argument and what jury instructions you anticipate so that the investigator can find facts in support of the theory of defense.
We live in a world of 15 second sound bites and themes and the jury expects them. Decide what your theory of defense will be and design some short sound bites and themes for the jury. Be consistent with the core facts and the emotions. Most juries decide the cases primarily based on instinct and emotions. The law and the facts are secondary. Tell the jury your defense theme and defense sound bites just like you would talk to a friend. Be human.
Your client is a human being. You are his or her primary mouth piece. Your client's freedom, future, and life --- depends upon you and you must be able to articulate your client's story and explain the life circumstances in detail of your client. Your client is a human being and not a monster and sometimes you may have to say to the jury ---- my client is a human being and not a monster.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Bureau of Justice Statistics Report - minorities more likely to be searched-arrested
Bureau of Justice Report - Minorities more likely to be searched and arrested
Read the Actual Bureau of Justice Report April 30, 2007
at:http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf
Black, Hispanic and white drivers are equally likely to be pulledover by police, but African Americans and Hispanics are much morelikely to be searched and arrested, a federal study found.And police are much more likely to use force against or to threatento use force against African Americans and Hispanics than againstwhites, whether in a traffic stop or another encounter, according tothe Justice Department
The study, released yesterday by the department's Bureau of JusticeStatistics, covered police contacts with the public during 2005 andwas based on interviews by the Census Bureau with nearly 64,000people age 16 or over."
The numbers are very consistent" with those found in a similarstudy of police-public contacts in 2002, said bureau statisticianMatthew R. Durose, a co-author of the report.
Traffic stops are the most frequent way police interact with thepublic, and minority groups have said that many stops and searchesare based on race. Some African Americans allege being pulled overfor "driving while black.""The available data is sketchy but deeply concerning," said HilaryO. Shelton, director of the NAACP's Washington bureau.
The NAACP hasdone surveys on traffic stops, and he said the racial disparitiesgrow larger as the studies delve deeper."It's very important to look at the hit rates for searches -- thenumber that actually result in finding a crime," Sheltonsaid. "There's a great deal of racial disparity there.""This report shows there are still disturbing disparities in termsof what happens to people of color after the stop," said Dennis D.Parker, director of the American Civil Liberties Union's racialjustice project. He also said better reporting is needed.This report, like the one for 2002, warns that the racialdisparities uncovered "do not constitute proof that police treatpeople differently along demographic lines."
The differences couldbe explained by circumstances not analyzed by the survey.Black, Hispanic and white motorists were equally likely to be pulledover by police -- between 8 percent and 9 percent of each group.The racial disparities showed up after that point:African Americans (9.5 percent) and Hispanics (8.8 percent) weremuch more likely to be searched than whites (3.6 percent).African Americans (4.5 percent) were more than twice as likely aswhites (2.1 percent) to be arrested. Hispanic drivers were arrested3.1 percent of the time.Among all police-public contacts, force was used 1.6 percent of thetime. But officers were more likely to use force against or tothreaten to use force against African Americans (4.4 percent) andHispanics (2.3 percent) than against whites (1.2 percent).
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Drug Treatment Facilities in Oklahoma
Long-term inpatient drug treatment facilities you can look up all Oklahoma facilities here:
http://dasis3.samhsa.gov/Default.aspx
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Judicial Integrity: A Call for its Re-Emergence
Judicial Integrity: A Call for its Re-Emergence in the Adjudication of Criminal Cases
ROBERT M. BLOOM Boston College - Law School
Boston College Law School Research Paper No. 1993-02 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 84, pp. 462-501, 1993
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=771587
Justice Rehnquist once said that there may be cases "in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction." See, U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
Our founding fathers were sensitive to the possible abuses of power by government and created three branches of government to assure checks and balances. The idea is that 'checks and balances' involves the importance of each branch curbing the excesses of the other branch. It is the idea that power can be successfully limited if it is shared and checked and balanced. The concept of checks and balances is associated with the independence and integrity of the judiciary.
Our founding fathers were sensitive to the perceived evils arising from the English system---a system in which the monarchy could utilize the courts for its own purposes.
According to Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion, in Olmstead v. U.S., he said:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the ends justifies the means----to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal----would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. Omstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928) at 485.
Decisions based upon sound principles may often be unpopular, especially where the accused appears guilty of a crime. The judicial branch in America was envisioned by the founding fathers as an independent branch not subject to outside influences or the popular demands of the masses. The fickle whims of the public are not a proper influence, as the courts need to rise above the fray and maintain themselves as a symbol of lawfulness. As stated by Justice Frankfurter, "public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the transcending value at stake." See, Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1957). It is in the long-term interest of society based upon the rule of law that its courts should be a symbol of lawfulness.
The full qoute by Justice Frankfurter, in the Sherman decision is as follows:
Insofar as they are used as instrumentalities in the administration of criminal justice, the federal courts have an obligation to set their face against enforcement of the law by lawless means or means that violate rationally vindicated standards of justice, and to refuse to sustain such methods by effectuating them. They do this in the exercise of a recognized jurisdiction to formulate and apply "proper standards for the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the federal courts," an obligation that goes beyond the conviction of the particular defendant before the court. Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the transcending value at stake. See, Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In our political culture, society sees the court as a symbol of justice.
There has been a tendency to give the executive (police) more discretion, such as the loosening of the probable cause standard from the specific two pronged approach to the imprecise "totality of the circumstances" standard, while at the same time there have been more and more limits placed upon judicial discretion, such as sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums, and enhancements. Thus, discretion is being created in the name of law enforcement, but there is a great reluctance to create it in the name of individual rights. Possibly, the re-emergence of principles of judicial integrity will act as a check on the increasing discretionary power of the police.
Government improprieties should not find an oasis within the court system.
See: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=771587
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
A GOOD SUMMARY OF THE LAW: STOPS, DETENTIONS, ARRESTS, & SEARCHES
STOPS, DETENTIONS, ARRESTS AND SEARCHES RESULTING FROM THEM
A. The police may stop a person or a vehicle whenever they have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980). This standard is a level of cause greater than mere suspicion or hunch, but less than probable cause to arrest. U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). In other words, if you have a case where it is clear the police did not have enough to arrest your client but stopped him nonetheless, the stop must be based on something more than a general suspicion or hunch that the person may be involved in criminal activity. If it is not you should pursue suppression of all evidence acquired as a result of the illegal stop.
B. Assuming the stop is based on reasonable suspicion, the police may detain your client long enough to investigate that reasonable suspicion. The detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). Therefore, assuming the police have stopped your client to investigate potential criminal behavior, have thereafter satisfied themselves that their suspicions were not warranted but continue to detain your client, you should file a motion seeking suppression of all evidence acquired or developed as a result of the detention.
C. During an investigative detention the police may do a "search for weapons" when they have a reasonable belief that your client may have weapons which may be used to assault the officer. This authority allows for a pat-down of your client's person, State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389 (1983), and a search of your client's vehicle. However, many police officers routinely do pat-downs and vehicle searches in the absence of particularized facts suggesting that they are in danger. When you encounter such a situation you should pursue a motion to suppress all evidence developed as a result of such a search.
D. One of the most common issues you will encounter is whether the police had enough evidence to arrest your client. Often it is the arrest that triggers the interrogation of your client and the search for and seizure of items from his person and/or vehicle. "Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and circumstances known to the police officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information warrant a prudent man into believing an offense has been committed and that the defendant probably committed it." Probable cause for arrest is the same as the level of probable cause required to issue a criminal complaint. Therefore, one practical way of answering this question is to ask whether the information known to the officer at the time of the arrest would be enough to charge your client with a crime. When you believe an arrest has been made without probable cause, and evidence acquired as a result, a suppression motion should be filed.
E. Often there is an argument as to exactly when an arrest occurred. The words "you are under arrest" are not required before a person is considered to be legally under arrest. Handcuffs, being placed in a locked vehicle and other such activities do not always answer the question either. The test is whether a reasonable person would consider him or herself to be in custody given the degree of restraint, the circumstances of the situation and verbal or nonverbal communications by the police. The subjective belief of the arrestee and of the police is not relevant. Therefore, where there is a convergence of lack of freedom with an objectively reasonable belief that such lack of freedom is associated with an accusation that your client has committed a crime, you should argue that your client is under arrest. The question then becomes whether there was enough evidence to support that arrest. When you think there is not you should file a motion seeking to suppress all evidence acquired as a result of the arrest.
F. The police are allowed to search your client and/or his vehicle whenever they have made a legal arrest. The justification for such a search is officer safety. However, if the search precedes the arrest it is illegal because the justification did not attached at the time of the search. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct. 484 (1998) and State v. Swanson, supra.
II. CAR SEARCHES
A. When the police have probable cause to belief that contraband is inside a vehicle they can search it absent a warrant. Such a search is justified by the mobility of the vehicle. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). However, the search for contraband is limited by the nature of the article for which probable cause exists. For example, if the police are looking for a person the search of a vehicle cannot legitimately extend to small containers in the vehicle. On the other hand, if the police are looking for small quantities of drugs, any portion of the vehicle, including closed containers, are legitimate targets of the search. Moreover, the police can open such a closed container. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
Therefore, the key inquiry is almost always whether the police have probable cause as to a specific item that they are looking for. When you believe they do not you should file a motion to suppress the fruits of the search for such an item and anything else found during the search.
III. CONSENT SEARCHES
A. The police may search your client, his vehicle, his home, his suitcase, etc., any time there is valid consent to search. You will often encounter this issue. The State has the burden to show that the person who gives consent was authorized to do so and that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. The consent must be more than nonresistance to police orders - especially where a person is under arrest. In Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587 (1978), the court held that "consent to entry is not to be lightly inferred, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence". The burden is on the State to show a "free, intelligent, unequivocal, unspecific waiver." Id. And don't forget, your client can limit the scope of his consent. Florida v. Jimeno, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991).
B. In most routine on-the-scene stops and arrests, the police will want to search your client and/or his vehicle. They will try to obtain consent to search when they know they don't have any other way to do it. Carefully evaluate whether the police have followed the rules on consent searches and if you believe that they have not, or you even suspect that they have not, pursue a suppression motion.
IV. HOME ENTRIES
In the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances the police can not enter a home, or its curtilage, to conduct a search or an arrest - even when they have probable cause. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct 1640 (1990). The most common "exigent circumstances" are hot pursuit, safety threat, evidence destruction and suspect flight. The police will almost always claim some sort of exigent circumstance when they lack a warrant. You should give such claims a great deal of scrutiny.
V. SEARCH WARRANTS
Many challenges to search warrants will not involve an evidentiary hearing. Instead, you will be arguing whether the warrant and/ or affidavit is facially sufficient. However, there are a couple of very important exceptions, which are discussed below.
A. You can bring a motion to suppress because the warrant is based upon illegally obtained evidence. Such a motion may require you to litigate the legality of the evidence that is referred to in the search warrant affidavit. For example, assume your client is illegally detained and searched. During the search the police discover evidence that suggests that your client's home contains contraband. A search warrant affidavit is prepared referring to the fruits of that illegal search and the probable cause for the search warrant is based upon those fruits. Under such circumstances all the evidence acquired pursuant to the search warrant should be suppressed.
B. Where probable cause for a warrant is based on false statements or omissions of the affiant and it can be shown that the statements/ omissions were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth the warrant may be invalid. You are entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this question. However, if there is other information in the affidavit supporting probable cause your motion will fail. See Franks v. Delaware 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978)
C. A search warrant must particularly describe the items that the police are authorized to search for and seize. The smaller the item the police are looking for the broader is the area the police can look for it inside your client's home. Sometimes the police will find what they are looking for right away but continue to search your client's home. Where the police search for and/or seize items not authorize by the warrant you can bring a motion to suppress such evidence.
D. Before the police can enter a home with a search warrant they must announce their presence, purpose and identity and allow the occupants of the home to voluntarily let them in. This rule is known as the "knock and announce rule." However, where the police have specific information indicating that evidence will be destroyed or that suspects are armed or likely to flee they can enter unannounced. State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729 (1998). You should always ask your client whether he heard an announcement and how long there was between the announcement and the police crashing through the door. While there is no specific time frame for how long the police must wait, anything less than ten seconds is likely to be considered unreasonable. These sorts of hearings are highly fact specific and it is recommended that you subpoena every officer who was present during the entry. Often you will find that the officers will give different versions as to what was said prior to entry and how long they waited before forcibly entering. See, generally, Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995); Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997).
E. All of the above search warrant issues - except, ironically, knock and announce - are potentially subject to Wisconsin's relatively new good faith exception. See State v. Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206 (2001) which holds that even if the warrant is defective evidence will not be suppressed if (1) the police acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant; (2) there was a "significant" investigation that preceded the issuance of the warrant and (3) the warrant was reviewed by another experienced officer trained in the requirements of probable cause or a government attorney. Therefore, to avoid a good faith claim you may need to litigate theses issues along with any others at your hearing.
VI. IDENTIFICATION
This topic has become one of increasing interest to many in the criminal justice system. Convictions based on mistaken identifications have been exposed and it looks like judges are more willing to consider granting motions challenging identifications than at any time in the recent past. What follows is a brief overview of the law in this area.
A. Police are allowed to conduct a "show up" (showing only one suspect) if it occurs during an investigative detention and is designed to confirm or dispel suspicion that a suspect is indeed the wanted perpetrator. However, the police often have more than enough probable cause to arrest someone and yet produce the client, alone, before the victim, in a highly suggestive manner.
B. The police most often will conduct a line up using photos. You will need to show that the lineup itself, or the way it was conducted was unnecessarily suggestive. Common factors are:
Statements by the police or others.
Dissimilarity in appearance.
Dissimilarity in presentation of suspects.
How easy it was to avoid suggestiveness.
Whether multiple witnesses affected each other's ID.
C. Unlike most suppression motions, the defense bears the initial burden of proof. The defendant must show a reasonable possibility that a hearing will establish a factual basis or legal theory for the defense to prevail before the court is required to hear the motion. Once the initial threshold has been met, the defense, at the actual hearing, has the burden to show the identification was unnecessarily suggestive. If the defense is successful in showing that the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the State can still prevail if it establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the identification is nonetheless reliable. This is a totality of the circumstances test. The court will look to whether the victim had a good chance to see the suspect, the degree of attention, the accuracy of a prior description, the level of certainty, the lapse of time between identification and the crime, and any prior identification of a person other than the defendant.
D. Even if the State fails to show that the identification was reliable, the State can still prevail by establishing, through clear and convincing evidence, that the in-court identification is based on an independent source. In other words, the source must be independent of the unduly suggestive lineup / show-up procedure that the court has ruled improper.
E. New guidelines for conducting line-ups have been recently promulgated by the Wisconsin Department of Justice and can be found at the following website: http://webmail.frontiernet.net/horde/services/go.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.doj.state.wi.us%2Fdles%2Ftns%2FEyewitnessPu. Lineups that have been conducted since the promulgation of these guidelines, but not pursuant to them, should be especially subject to a suppression motion in Wisconsin anyway......
F. As you can tell from the information above, winning identification suppression motion is very difficult. However, pursuing such a motion - even where you expect to lose - may be more important than anything else you can do in an identification case. Your only opportunity to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the alleged victims claim that your client was the guy may be lost if you fail to pursue such a motion.
VII. CONFESSIONS
The police will try to get your client to confess in almost every case and often your client's confession is the most damaging piece of evidence. The police are trained to get your client to confess even when he or she does not want to. There are several requirements that must be met, by the State, before your client's statement is considered admissible as evidence. These requirements will be discussed, in general terms, below. As a procedural matter, you should know that motions to suppress statements do not require a written motion unless the defense wishes a hearing prior to trial. §971.31(3), Stats. Nonetheless, most judges expect the issue to be raised pretrial.
A. Voluntariness of Statements
1. Before a statement can be considered admissible it must be obtained under such circumstances that it represents the uncoerced free will of the defendant.
Police misconduct - coercion of some type is necessary before a finding of involuntariness can be had.
3. You can also move to suppress a witness' statement based on police misconduct - but the standard is higher. It must be egregious such that it produces statements that are unreliable as a matter of law. The coercion must be egregious because, as we have shown, it is typically "egregious" police misconduct that offends due process."
4. The totality of the circumstances determines voluntariness. It is a balance between the defendant's personal characteristics and police pressure.
Common factors which affect voluntariness are:
a) Age of the accused;
b) Whether the accused is appraised of constitutional rights;
c) Whether there is a request for counsel;
d) The police response to a request for counsel;
e) Physical condition of the accused;
f) Mental condition of the accused;
g) Delay before first court appearance;
h) Showing defendant crime victims;
i) Sleep deprivation;
j) Intoxication;
Previous defendant experience with the police;
Police Threats;
Relays of interrogators;
Physical abuse; and
Promises of leniency.
5. The police are allowed to lie (usually about the strength of the case against your client) in order to get a confession. However, deceit is a factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis.
An involuntary confession cannot be used for any purpose at trial.
B. Miranda Issues
1. A suspect, who is in custody, and who the police want to question, must be advised of: (1) his right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can and will be used against him in court, (3) that before and during questioning he is entitled to the presence and aid of an attorney, and (4) if the suspect cannot afford an attorney one will be furnished at public expense. The court in Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) said: "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Direct interrogation is not required to invoke Miranda. Anything that is designed to elicit an incriminating response is the functional equivalent of questioning. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
2. Providing Miranda warnings is only the first step. The police must also establish that the suspect understood the rights and voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived them. See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 475
3. The assertion of the right to counsel requires that the police stop all questioning until a lawyer has been provided or the suspect initiates further conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). State v. Wegner, 118 Wis. 419 (Ct. App. 1984).
4. Equivocal requests for an attorney are not sufficient to invoke the right to counsel. United States v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
5. If your client asserts the right to remain silent, the police must "scrupulously" honor such an assertion. Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). But your client can reinitiate conversation, as can the police if they re-administer Miranda.
6. If the police obtain a confession without Miranda warnings, and subsequently obtain a second confession, which is preceded by Miranda warnings, the second confession is admissible; the first is not. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
7. A voluntary statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used during the state's case-in-chief but may be used in rebuttal if your client testifies at trial. Harris v. New York, 91 S. Ct.643 (1971).
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Master Criminal Defense: Gerry Spence's Great Trial Lawyers College
http://www.triallawyerscollege.com/publicat/warrior.html
Free Articles from Gerry Spence's magazine - The Warrior:
Very good Article on jury voir dire:
In the Moment Approach to Voir Dire-- by Joane Garcia-Colson and Fredilyn Sison
Other great articles:
Money Justice for Love, Comfort, and Society in a Wrongful Death Case-- by J. Jude Basile
TLC Methods at Work-- by Maren Lynn Chaloupka
Learning to Fight Against the Death Penalty-- by Daniel R. Williams
Judges Respond to New Judicial College-- by Pat Reynolds and Lynne
BratcherPsychodramatic Techniques in a Soft Tissue Case-- by Corinne M. Mullen
The WARRIOR - America On The Verge
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
Consensual Police Encounter Transformed into Seizure
Consensual Police Encounter Transformed into Seizure
Robert Kaupp v Texas #02-5636, May 5, 2003 73 CrL 2042
The United States Supreme Court held that, even though a defendant fully cooperated with police officers and said “okay” to being transported to the police station for questioning, the defendant was under de facto arrest. The Court found that even an initially consensual encounter can be transformed into a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The detention here, which involved a 17-year-old boy being awakened late at night and taken to the police station in his underwear, was indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Coupled with the officers’ statement, “we need to go and talk,” the circumstances presented no option but “to go,” concluded the Court. Case below: unpublished opinion, 2001 WL 619119 (TexApp).
Download this summary in Word Perfect format.View fulltext of this opinion from the FindLaw Web Site.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments
General Witness Information for Defendant's Relatives in Criminal Cases
General Witness Information for Defendant's
A defendant should say nothing to a witness which may be a basis for the court to revoke the defendant’s bond, or which may be interpreted as threatening or harassing a witness. A defendant should be aware that any statements made to the witness or to the lawyer in front of the witness are capable of being repeated in court. For instance, if a witness is forced to come to court to testify, a prosecutor may ask the witness about any statements which the defendant made to the witness and a witness may be compelled to testify as to those statements. A witness against the defendant or potential witness should never be present during the private confidential communications between the defense attorney and the defendant because those conversations would not be confidential if the witness is asked a question about that conversation and the witness was present during those communications between the attorney and the defendant.
A defendant should never orally suggest to a witness that they do not appear in court because this could be interpreted as threatening a witness or possible witness tampering. Additionally, it could be obstruction of justice or witness tampering for a defendant to instruct a witness not to appear in court. The defendant’s lawyer is likewise prohibited from instructing a witness against the defendant not to appear in court.
The best thing for a witness against the defendant to do is to contact another criminal defense lawyer by telephone and ask about what their options are in such a case.
If the witness is "served" with a subpoena, then the witness must appear in court or a warrant could be issued for the arrest of the witness.
If a witness does not receive or get served with a subpoena because they moved, then how would the witness know to appear in court and no warrant would be issued unless there was proof that the witness received the subpoena. NOTE: The statutes are unclear but there is an interpretation that service of a subpoena on a relative at the witness residence or anyone at the witness residence may arguably be considered good service. But, if party served at residence immediately informs server at time that witness has previously moved then service may not be valid. A prosecutor may telephone the witness at the last known telephone number and if the witness admits to receiving a subpoena but failed to appear in court then the prosecutor can file an application with the court seeking a material witness warrant for the witness (normally only felony cases). Additionally, if the prosecutor can prove that the witness is purposefully avoiding service, such as the prosecutor talks to the witness by phone or a police officer talks to the witness or there is evidence that the witness is purposefully avoiding service, then the prosecutor can file an application with the court seeking a material witness warrant in anticipation that the witness will not appear in court because the witness is purposefully avoiding the service of a subpoena. There is a statute that provides that "upon probable cause" a police office may summarily arrest a witness who indicates that they will not appear in court but only on FELONY cases. See: 22 OS 720
It is highly unlikely that a prosecutor will dismiss a case just because the witness requests that the case be dismissed, but if there is not enough evidence then the prosecutor has no choice but to dismiss the case. If there are witness statements made to a police officer, then the witness can be prosecuted if they appear in court and say their previous statement was not true (filing false police report or perjury).
One questionable technique are prosecution/police threats to have minor children removed or create a DHS investigation. This behavior could be questioned.
Posted by
Unknown
0
comments